Abstract. This work deals with "MPC-friendly" linear secret sharing schemes (LSSS), a mathematical primitive upon which secure multi-party computation (MPC) can be based and which was introduced by Cramer, Damgaard and Maurer (EUROCRYPT 2000). Chen and Cramer proposed a special class of such schemes that is constructed from algebraic geometry and that enables efficient secure multi-party computation over fixed finite fields (CRYPTO 2006). We extend this in four ways. First, we propose an abstract coding-theoretic framework in which this class of schemes and its (asymptotic) properties can be cast and analyzed. Second, we show that for every finite field Fq, there exists an infinite family of LSSS over Fq that is asymptotically good in the following sense: the schemes are "ideal," i.e., each share consists of a single Fq-element, and the schemes have t-strong multiplication on n players, where the corruption tolerance 3t n−1 tends to a constant ν(q) with 0 < ν(q) < 1 when n tends to infinity. Moreover, when |Fq| tends to infinity, ν(q) tends to 1, which is optimal. This leads to explicit lower bounds on τ (q), our measure of asymptotic optimal corruption tolerance. We achieve this by combining the results of Chen and Cramer with a dedicated field-descent method. In particular, in the F2-case there exists a family of binary t-strongly multiplicative ideal LSSS with 3t n−1 ≈ 2.86% when n tends to infinity, a one-bit secret and just a one-bit share for every player. Previously, such results were shown for Fq with q ≥ 49 a square. Third, we present an infinite family of ideal schemes with t-strong multiplication that does not rely on algebraic geometry and that works over every finite field Fq. Its corruption tolerance vanishes, yet still 3t n−1
Introduction
This work deals with "MPC-friendly" linear secret sharing schemes (LSSS), an abstract mathematical primitive upon which secure multi-party computation (MPC) can be based and which was introduced by Cramer, Damgaard and Maurer [13] . Chen and Cramer [8] proposed a special class of such schemes that is constructed from algebraic geometry and that enables efficient secure multiparty computation over fixed finite fields. For every finite field F q where q is a square with q ≥ 49, they presented an infinite family of LSSS over F q that is asymptotically good in the following sense. First, the schemes are "ideal": each share consists of a single F q -element. Second, the schemes have t-strong multiplication [13, 12, 9, 8] on n players, where the corruption tolerance 3t n−1 tends by a constant ν(q) with 0 < ν(q) < 1 when n tends to infinity. Moreover, when |F q | tends to infinity, ν(q) tends to 1, which is optimal (since it is well-known that 3t + 1 ≤ n always). In short, strong multiplication is a property that enables to "perfectly securely" verify multiplicative relations among secret-shared values, with error probability equal to zero. This is a crucial subroutine at the heart of MPC. Please refer to [13] for the details.
These schemes of [8] enjoy algebraic properties similar to those of Shamir's scheme (linearity, (strong)-multiplication), and MPC protocols in the strongest information-theoretic model [2, 3] (i.e., perfect security against a computationally unbounded threshold adversary that corrupts some fraction of the players) are quite similar (see [13, 8] ). The significance of these schemes, however, derives from the fact that the number of players is not bounded by the size of the finite field as is the case for Shamir's scheme [26] . In fact, in these schemes the number of players is unbounded even if the finite field is fixed. In the corresponding MPC-protocols, the total number of field elements communicated will typically be the same, with the notable difference, however, that the field elements are now taken in a field of constant rather than linearly increasing size. This makes sense, for instance, if the function that is securely computed is defined over a small, constant size field, say F 2 . The price to be paid is only a constant fractional decrease compared to the corruption tolerance of (non-asymptotic) Shamir-based MPC-protocols, in which up to 1/3 of the players may be corrupted. The construction of these "MPC-friendly" schemes from [8] is based on the existence of families of algebraic curves of finite fields with a good ratio between the number of rational points and their genus and the use of their algebraic function fields. See [13, 8, 6 ] for a full discussion. Chen, Cramer, Goldwasser, de Haan and Vaikuntanatan [7] have shown similar results for schemes with multiplication rather than strong multiplication by a construction from arbitrary classical codes rather than algebraic geometric ones.
The results from [8, 7] have found remarkable applications in the breakthrough work of Ishai, Kushilevitz, Ostrovsky and Sahai [20] on two-party zeroknowledge for circuit-satisfiability with low communication, in that of Ishai, Prabhakaran and Sahai [19] on oblivious transfer, as well as in the work of Damgaard, Nielsen and Wichs [14] on isolated zero-knowledge. In all these cases this helped improving the communication efficiency. It is important to note that Second, we show that for every finite field F q , there exists an infinite family of LSSS over F q that is asymptotically good in the following sense: the schemes are "ideal," i.e., each share consists of a single F q -element, and the schemes have t-strong multiplication on n players, where the corruption tolerance 3t n−1 tends to a constant ν(q) with 0 < ν(q) < 1 when n tends to infinity. Moreover, when |F q | tends to infinity, ν(q) tends to 1, which is optimal. This leads to explicit lower bounds on τ (q). Our method combines the algebraic geometric schemes of Chen and Cramer with our dedicated but elementary field-descent method based on "multiplication-friendly functions," which maps C ∈ C † (F q m ) to C ∈ C † (F q ) in such a way that corruption tolerance does not degrade too much. In particular, in the F 2 -case there exists a family of binary t-strongly multiplicative ideal LSSS with 3t n−1 ≈ 2.86% when n tends to infinity, a one-bit secret and just a one-bit share for every player. Previously, such results were only shown to hold over F q with q ≥ 49 a square.
Third, we present an infinite family of ideal schemes with t-strong multiplication that does not rely on algebraic geometry and that works over every finite field F q . Its corruption tolerance vanishes, yet still 3t n−1 = Ω(1/(log log n) log n). Fourth and finally, we give an improved non-asymptotic upper bound on corruption tolerance.
The outline of this paper is as follows. After the preliminaries in Section 2, we revisit in Section 3 the results in [7] about the construction of LSSS from linear codes, where we focus mainly on privacy and reconstruction. In some cases we define new notions and prove stronger results needed in the sequel. In Section 4 we define C † (F q ), t(C) and τ (q), and prove some properties. In Section 5 we show that for every finite fields F q , the asymptotic optimal corruption tolerance can be bounded away from zero, i.e., τ (q) > 0 for all finite field F q , and we give explicit lower bounds. In Section 6 we state the consequences for LSSS with strong multiplication explicitly and in Section 7 we present the elementary example with ("not-so-fast") vanishing asymptotic corruption tolerance. In Section 8, we
give our non-asymptotic upper bound on corruption tolerance. In Section 9 we conclude by stating some open problems.
Finally, we note that, in upcoming work [5] , we further improve our asymptotic lower bounds on optimal corruption tolerance using more advanced methods from algebraic geometry, especially for small values of q.
Preliminaries

Basic Coding Theory
We review some notions from basic coding theory (see e.g. [22] or [17] ) that are relevant to this work and we also introduce some conventions specific to this paper. Let n be a non-negative integer and let k be an integer with 0 ≤ k ≤ n+1.
. The length n + 1 of such a code C is denoted (C). We define n(C) = (C) − 1. If c ∈ C, (c 0 , c 1 , . . . , c n ) ∈ F n+1 q denotes its coordinate vector. In particular, we use the set I(C) = {0, 1, . . . , n} to index the coordinates, unless otherwise stated. A linear code over F q is an [n + 1, k] q -code for some k, n. If B ⊂ I(C) is a non-empty set and if x = (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ F n+1 q , x B denotes the vector (x i ) i∈B ∈ F |B| q , i.e., the vector obtained by restricting x to those coordinates i with i ∈ B. The support supp(x) of x ∈ F n+1 q is the set of indices i ∈ I(C) with x i = 0. An element c ∈ C is minimal if there is no c ∈ C \ {0} with supp(c ) a proper subset of supp(c).
A generator matrix G for an [n+1, k]-code C is a matrix with entries in F q and that has k columns and n + 1 rows such that the columns of G jointly constitute an F q -basis of C. The Hamming-weight w H (x) of x = (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ F n+1 q is the number of indices with x i = 0. Let d be a positive integer with 0
The dual C ⊥ of C is the "orthogonal complement" of C in F n+1 q according to the standard scalar product x, y = x 0 y 0 + x 1 y 1 + · · · + x n y n , where x = (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ F n+1 q and y = (y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y n ) ∈ F n+1 q . Thus, C ⊥ consists of all c * ∈ F n+1 q such that c, c
Secret Sharing
In this section we give precise definitions of (linear) secret sharing (with strong multiplication). A secret sharing scheme (SSS) Σ = (S 0 , S 1 , . . . , S n ) is a vector of n + 1 random variables, where n is a positive integer and where the random variables are all defined on the same finite probability distribution. It is required that H(S 0 |S 1 . . . S n ) = 0 and that H(S 0 ) > 0. Here H(·) denotes the Shannonentropy function and H(·|·) denotes conditional entropy. A value taken by S 0 is a "secret", and a value taken by S i , is a "share" or "the i-th share", i = 1 . . . n. Write P = P(Σ) = {1, . . . , n} and n(Σ) = n. An element i ∈ P may sometimes be called "player." If A ⊂ P is non-empty, S A denotes the vector of random variables (S i ) i∈A . Note that this bare definition only says that there is some non-constant "secret" that is uniquely determined by the n shares.
The adversary structure A(Σ) consists of the empty set as well as any nonempty sets A ⊂ P such that H(S 0 |S A ) = H(S 0 ) ("no information about the secret"). The access structure Γ (Σ) consists of all B ⊂ P such that H(S 0 |S B ) = 0 ("full information about the secret"). By definition, P ∈ Γ (Σ). From a basic information theoretic inequality, H(S 0 ) ≥ H(S 0 |S B ) for all non-empty sets B ⊂ P. Therefore, Γ (Σ) ∩ A(Σ) = ∅. Let t, r be positive integers. We say that Σ achieves t-privacy if A(Σ) includes all sets A ⊂ P with |A| = t and we say that Σ achieves r-reconstruction if Γ (Σ) includes all sets B ⊂ P with |B| = r. Furthermore, r(Σ) denotes the minimum integer r for which Σ has r-reconstruction and t(Σ) is the largest integer t such that A(Σ) includes all sets A ⊂ P with |A| = t. A threshold SSS is one that achieves t-privacy and t + 1-reconstruction for some positive integer t. An (n, t + 1, t)-threshold SSS is one that achieves t-privacy and t + 1-reconstruction for some integer t, with n being the number of players.
P . An element i ∈ P is "not a dummy" if there exists a set B ∈ Γ (Σ) with i ∈ B that is minimal with respect to the partial ordering Γ (Σ) defined by the inclusion-relation. In a perfect SSS it holds that H(S i ) ≥ H(S 0 ) for each i ∈ P which is not a dummy ("length of a share is at least length of the secret"). A perfect SSS is ideal if for each such i ∈ P equality holds. If Γ (Σ) does not contain any dummies, it is called connected.
A linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) is a tuple Σ = (F q , n, e, v 0 , V 1 , . . . , V n ) where F q is a finite field, e, n are positive integers, v 0 ∈ F e q \ {0}, and V 1 , . . . , V n are subspaces of the F q -vector space F e q such that v 0 ∈ i∈P V i , the subspace of F e q spanned by the V i 's. An LSSS is an SSS in the sense of the definition above if the following conventions are made. Write d i for the F q -dimension of V i , i = 1 . . . n. First, for each V i an F q -basis B i = {b i1 , . . . , b idi } is fixed. Second, the random variables S 0 , S 1 , . . . , S n are defined as follows. The secret s ∈ F q is chosen uniformly at random (thereby defining S 0 ) and φ ∈ Hom Fq (F e q , F q ), the F q -linear map from F e q to F q , is chosen uniformly random conditioned on
For a non-empty set A ⊂ P, we define V A = i∈A V i and we call its F q -dimension d A . It can be shown that a non-empty set B ⊂ P satisfies B ∈ Γ (Σ) if and only if v 0 ∈ V B . Equivalently, it can be shown A ∈ A(Σ) if and only if there exists φ ∈ Hom Fq (F e q , F q ) such that φ(v 0 ) = 1 and φ vanishes on V A , i.e., φ(v) = 0 for all v ∈ V A . In particular, this means that LSSS are perfect. We define dim Σ = n i=1 d i , the dimension of the LSSS. Shamir's scheme is a threshold LSSS.
Given an LSSS Σ we define the dual access structure to Γ (Σ) as Γ (Σ) * = {A ⊂ P, s.t. P \ A / ∈ Γ (Σ)}. For every LSSS Σ over F q there exists an LSSS Σ * over F q such that dim Σ = dim Σ * and Γ (Σ * ) = Γ (Σ) * (see [21, 13] ). Note that r(Σ * ) = n − t(Σ), t(Σ * ) = n − r(Σ). Let v = (v 1 , . . . , v e ) ∈ F e q and w = (w 1 , . . . , w e ) ∈ F e q . Then v ⊗ w = (v 1 · w, . . . , v e · w) ∈ F e 2 q denotes the Kronecker-product (or tensor-product) of v and w. For x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ F n q , y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) ∈ F n q , their Schur-product x * y ∈ F n q is defined as (x 1 y 1 , . . . , x n y n ). If V and W are subspaces of the F q -vector space F e q , then V ⊗ W denotes the subspace of the F q -vector space F e 2 q generated by the elements v ⊗ w with v ∈ V and w ∈ W . If A ⊂ {1, . . . , n} is non-empty, V A denotes i∈A V i ⊗ V i , the subspace of the F q -vector space F e 2 q spanned by the subspaces V i ⊗ V i . Σ has t-strong multiplication ( [13, 12, 8] ) if the following holds: 0 ≤ t ≤ n, Σ achieves t-privacy, v 0 ⊗ v 0 ∈ V P , and for each set B ⊂ P with
Σ has multiplication if it achieves t-privacy for some t ≥ 1 and if v 0 ⊗ v 0 ∈ V P .
Algebraic Function Fields and Codes
In this paper we make at some point use of some basic as well as some more advanced results for algebraic function fields. We use the terminology of [27] . For a quick introduction to some of the notions that are needed (function fields, poles, zeroes, divisors, degrees, etc.), please refer to [8] . Let F q be a finite field. When we say that F is an algebraic function field over F q we mean that F is an algebraic function field over F q in one variable and that F q is the full constant field of F. P q (F) denotes the set of places of degree 1 and g(F) denotes the genus of F. If G is a divisor on F, then deg(G) denotes its degree and L(G) ⊂ F denotes the Riemann-Roch space of functions f ∈ F such that div(f ) + G is an effective divisor or f = 0. This is an F q -vector space.
By 
Suppose P q (F) ≥ n + 1 for some positive integer n. Let P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P n be distinct elements of P q (F) and define the divisor
The distance of its dual code can be estimated using the Residue Theorem.
Define N q (g) as the maximum of |P q (F)| where F ranges over all the function fields whose full field of constants is F q and whose genus is g. The DrinfeldVladuts upper bound (see e.g. [27] or [29] ) states that for all finite fields
the Hasse-Weil bound (see e.g. [27] ) states that
Connecting Secret Sharing and Codes
We describe one connection between secret sharing and codes that is particularly relevant to this work. Let C be a linear code over F q with n(C) ≥ 1. Let i ∈ I(C).
Under further conditions on C to be formulated precisely later on, consider the following perfect secret sharing scheme, denoted Σ(C, i), on the player set P = I(C) \ {i}. Let s ∈ F q be the secret, and choose c = (c 0 , c 1 , . . . , c n ) ∈ C uniformly at random such that c i = s. For all j ∈ I(C) \ {i} the share for the j-th player is c j . In [7] this approach to secret sharing [23, 24] is exploited to achieve LSSS with multiplication (no strong multiplication), t-privacy and rreconstruction and with very good asymptotic properties over fixed finite fields. While in [7] privacy and reconstruction parameters of these LSSS are bounded exclusively in terms of the minimum distance of the codes involved, in the present paper we need a more accurate understanding of these parameters. This is what we will develop first.
Definition 1 Let n be an integer with n ≥ 1 and let F q be a finite field. For a non-empty set B ⊂ {0, 1, . . . , n}, the F q -linear projection map π B is defined as π q,n+1 B
:
When q and n are clear from the context, we write π B instead. Also, if B = {i} for some index i, we write π i instead of π {i} .
Lemma 1 Let C be a linear code over F q with n(C) ≥ 1. Let i ∈ I(C) and let B ⊂ I(C)\{i} be a non-empty set. Then there exists a function ρ B,i :
Proof. In the forward direction, suppose ρ B,i exists. Then it is an F q -linear map, since ρ B,i (λc Note that by linearity of C, the lemma above also holds when π i (c) = 0 is replaced by π i (c) = 1.
Definition 2 Notation being as in Lemma 1, we say that (i, B) is a reconstructionpair if ρ B,i exists.
Corollary 1 Let C be a linear code over F q with n(C) ≥ 1 and let i ∈ I(C).
-(i, I(C) \ {i}) is a reconstruction-pair if and only if u i ∈ C.
-π i (C) = {0} if and only if u i ∈ C ⊥ .
-For all j ∈ I(C), (j, I(C) \ {j}) is a reconstruction-pair and π j (C) = {0} if and
Definition 3 Let C be a code over F q with n(C) ≥ 1. Let i ∈ I(C) and suppose u i ∈ C. If u i ∈ C ⊥ , then define r i (C) = 0. Else, define r i (C) as the smallest positive integer ρ i such that for all B ⊂ I(C) \ {i} with |B| = ρ i it holds that (i, B) is a reconstruction-pair.
Note that by Corollary 1, the value r i (C) is well-defined, and satisfies 0 ≤ r i (C) ≤ n(C).
Definition 4 Let C be a code over F q with n(C) ≥ 1. Let i ∈ I(C) and suppose u i ∈ C ⊥ . Define t i (C) as the largest positive integer τ i such that for each set A ⊂ I(C) \ {i} with |A| = τ i it holds that (i, A) is not a reconstruction-pair. Equivalently, this is satisfied if and only if there exists c ∈ C with π i (c) = 1 and π A (c) = 0. If no such integer exists, t i (C) = 0 by definition.
Note that by Corollary 1, the value t i (C) is well-defined, and satisfies 0 ≤ t i (C) < n(C).
Lemma 2 Let C be a linear code over Proof. The conditions imply that n(C) ≥ 1. Lemma 3 Let C be a code over F q with n(C) ≥ 1 and let i ∈ I(C). Then:
Proof. As to Claim 1,if d min (C) ≤ 2, there is nothing to prove. Else, if we "prune" the code C at d min (C) − 2 coordinates (not including i), then we get a code C with d min (C ) > 1. The claim now follows from Corollary 1. As to Claim 2, d min (C) > 1, then r i is well-defined for all i ∈ I(C). Select an element c in C of minimal weight d min (C). Take any i ∈ supp(c) and define B = I(C) \ supp(c). Clearly |B| = n(C) − d min (C) + 1 and (i, B) is not a reconstructionpair because π i (c) = 0 and π B (c) = 0. Therefore
which was what remained to be proved. As to Claim 3, this follows directly from Lemma 2. As to Claim 4, if d min (C ⊥ ) > 1, then t i is well-defined for all i ∈ I(C). So if B ⊂ I(C) is any set with |B| = 1 + min i∈I(C) t i (C), then for each j ∈ B there exists c ∈ C such that π j (c) = 1 and π B (c) = 0, where B = B\{j}. Thus, π B (C) = F |B| q , and by Lemma 2,
, which was what remained to be proved.
Definition 5 Let C be a linear code over F q with n(C) ≥ 1. We define I(C) as the set consisting of all indices i ∈ I(C) such that u i ∈ C and u i ∈ C ⊥ . C(F q ) is the collection of all linear codes C over F q such that I(C) = ∅.
Note that I(C) = ∅ implies n(C) ≥ 1 and that I(C) = I(C) if and only if d min (C) > 1 and d min (C ⊥ ) > 1. For completeness we state the following straightforward characterization of C(F q ). If C is a linear code over F q with n(C) ≥ 1 and if I(C) = ∅, then it holds for all i ∈ I(C) that the i-th coordinate of elements of C is always equal to zero or that the i-th unit vector u i ∈ C. After permutating indices, if necessary, the set C is then equal to a Cartesian product F q × · · · × F q × {0} × · · · × {0}. On the other hand, if C decomposes as above, then clearly I(C) = ∅.
Theorem 1 Let C ∈ C(F q ) and let i ∈ I(C). Suppose c ∈ C is chosen uniformly at random. Then the following holds.
1. π i (C) ∈ F q has the uniform distribution. Proof. As to Claim 1, i ∈ I(C) implies in particular that for each x ∈ F q there exists c ∈ C such that π i (c) = x. Moreover, their number is equal to the cardinality of the kernel of the map π i . Hence this number does not depend on x and the claim follows. Claim 2 follows from the definition of r i (C). As to Claim 3, this follows from Lemma 3 plus pruning. As to Claim 4, if |A| ≤ t i (C), then there exists c ∈ C with π i (c ) = 1 and π A (c ) = 0. This implies that for each (x, y) with x ∈ F q and y ∈ π B (C), there exists c ∈ C with π i (c ) = x and π A (c ) = y. More precisely, their number is equal to the cardinality of the kernel of the map π A∪{i} , and the claim follows. As to Claim 5, this follows from Lemma 3. As to Claim 6, by Lemma 2 it holds that for each y ∈ F |A| q , there exists c ∈ C with π A (c) = y. Their number is equal to the cardinality of the kernel of the map π A , and, as maximality also follows from Lemma 2, the claim follows.
Remark 1 Let C ∈ C(F q ) and let i ∈ I(C). Then Σ(C, i) can be viewed as an LSSS.
Proof
such that G T x = 0 and x 0 = 1, where G T denotes the transpose of G. Thus, v 0 is in the
The parameter e from the LSSS definition is equal to k, the dimension of C. Thus, (F q , n, e, v 0 , V 1 , . . . , V n ) thus defined is an LSSS by definition. The secret sharing scheme it generates (see Section 2) is identical to choosing b ∈ F n+1 q at random and setting (s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n ) T = Gb. Since G is a generator matrix of C, this secret sharing scheme is identical to Σ(C, i).
Strongly Multiplicative LSSS from Codes
In this section we define a special class of codes that imply strongly multiplicative LSSS.
Definition 6 For x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ F n q , y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) ∈ F n q , their Schurproduct x * y ∈ F n q is defined as (x 1 y 1 , . . . , x n y n ). Let C be a linear code over F q . The linear code C over F q is the linear code F q < {x * y} x,y∈C >, i.e., the F q -linear span of the vectors of the form x * y with x, y ∈ C.
Lemma 4 Let C be a linear code over F q with n(C) ≥ 1 and let i ∈ I(C). Then:
Generally, u i ∈ C does not necessarily imply u i ∈ C.
Definition 7 C
† (F q ) denotes the set of all F q -linear codes C with I( C) = ∅.
Note that C † (F q ) = ∅ for all finite fields F q .
The LSSS Σ(C) is by definition Σ(C, i) where i is the smallest index where this maximum is attained. Write i s for this index.
Note that r i ( C) is well-defined in the definition of t(C) since C ∈ C(F q ) and i ∈ I( C). Generally, C ∈ C(F q ) does not even need to imply C ∈ C † (F q ). In fact, only for special classes of codes one seems to be able to bound t(C) non-trivially, sometimes in combination with this Corollary to Theorem 1.
Proof. The definitions of tensor product and scalar product imply the first claim. The second follows by combination of the bilinearity of the scalar product and the facts that the F q -linear span of the vectors a ⊗ b with a, b ∈ F e q is equal to F e 2 q and that the scalar-product with a given vector is always zero if and only if that vector equals the zero-vector.
Theorem 2 Let C ∈ C † (F q ). Suppose t(C) ≥ 1 and let t be an integer with
and Σ(C) has t-strong multiplication.
Proof. We first argue t-strong multiplication. Assume w.l.o.g. that i s = 0 (Definition 8). By Theorem 1, Σ(C) satisfies t-privacy. Write n = n( C) (= n(C)). Since t(C) ≥ 1, r 0 ( C) < n. Now choose a generator matrix G for C. Write v 0 for its top row, write v i for the i-th row below and write V i for the one-dimensional space V i spanned by it, i = 1 . . . n. Let B ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be a nonempty set. First, note that there exists a vector λ ∈ F n q such that i∈B π i (λ) ( 
q . Indeed, the forward direction follows by rewriting and the reverse direction follows from Lemma 5 (2nd item). By re-writing and by using Lemma 5 (1st item), this is equivalent to i∈B π i (λ)
q . This may be rewritten as (Gb) * (Gb ), y = 0 for all b, b ∈ F e q , where π 0 (y) = −1, π i (y) = π i (λ) if i ∈ B, and π i (y) = 0 for all other indices. Equivalently, i∈B λ i π i (c)π i (c ) = π 0 (c)π 0 (c ) for all c, c ∈ C, since G is a generator matrix of C. By definition of t, there exists, for each choice of B with |B| = n−t, a vector λ ∈ F n q such that the latter condition is satisfied for the set B. We conclude that t-strong multiplication holds, as desired. As to the remaining claims, let B ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be such that |B| = n − 2t. Write A = {1, . . . , n} \ B. Choose a disjoint partition A 0 ∪ A 1 = A with |A 0 | = |A 1 | = t. By Lemma 2 there exists c ∈ C such that π 0 (c ) = 1 and π A0 (c ) = 0. Let c ∈ C be arbitrary and consider the vector c * c ∈ C. Note that this vector has coordinates equal to zero at those indices i with i ∈ A 0 . Since C has (n − t)-reconstruction, there exists a vector x ∈ F n q such that it has coordinates equal to zero at those indices i with i ∈ A 1 and π 0 (c * c ) = n i=1 π i (x)π i (c * c ). It now follows that π 0 (c) = i∈B (π i (x) · π i (c ))π i (c), for all c ∈ C. Thus, there is (n − 2t)-reconstruction. Since there is also t-privacy, it follows that t ≤ 1 3 (n(C) − 1). Finally, the remark about fulfilment of the conditions follows from Theorem 1.
We introduce the notion of asymptotic optimal corruption tolerance for the class of codes C † (F q ).
Definition 9 Let F q be a finite field. For C ∈ C † (F q ), we define τ (C) = 3· t(C) n(C)−1 . We call value τ (C) the corruption tolerance of the code C.
Note that 0 ≤ τ (C) ≤ 1 always, where the upper bound follows from Theorem 2. Let t, n be positive integers with 3t < n and let F q be a finite field with q > n. If C is a polynomial evaluation code ("Reed-Solomon code") over F q of length n + 1, defined from evaluation of the polynomials of degree at most t, then τ (C) = 1, and, of course, Σ(C) is Shamir's (n, t + 1, t)-threshold LSSS.
Definition 10 (Asymptotic optimal corruption tolerance). Let F q be a finite field. Then we define τ (q) = lim sup C∈C † (Fq) τ (C).
Note that τ (C) = 1 implies that Σ(C) is an (n, t + 1, t)-threshold LSSS over F q , with n = 3t + 1. For fixed q there are only finitely many C ∈ C † (F q ) such that τ (C) = 1 (the proof for this statement is easily extracted from [8] ; in fact, in Section 8 we prove a stronger statement). Since for each length there are only a finite number of codes of that length when F q is constant, this means that for each > 0 there exists an infinite family of codes C ∈ C † (F q ) with (C) tending to infinity and | τ (q) − τ (C)| < .
Bounding τ (q) Away from Zero for Arbitrary F q
The main result of this section is the fact that τ (q) > 0 for every finite field F q . First, we need to restate and reprove part of the results (Theorems 3 and 6) of [8] on algebraic geometric strongly multiplicative secret sharing in the technical framework of the present paper. Throughout this section F q denotes the finite field with q elements. [8] ) Let F be an algebraic function field over F q . Suppose |P q (F)| > 4(g(F) + 1). Let t, n be any integers such that 1 ≤ t < n, |P q (F)| ≥ n + 1, and 3t < n − 4 · g(F). Then there exists a code C ∈ C † (F q ) such that (C) = n + 1 and t(C) ≥ t. In particular, Σ(C) has t-strong multiplication.
Theorem 3 (Chen and Cramer
Proof. By the condition on |P q (F)|, there exist integers t, n satisfying the constraints from the theorem. Now fix such t, n. By Corollary 2, it is sufficient to show the existence of C ∈ C † (F q ) with (C) = n + 1, d min (C ⊥ ) > t + 1 and d min ( C) > t + 1. Write g = g(F). Let P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P n ∈ P q (F) be distinct places of degree 1, and define the divisor D = n i=0 P i . Choose a divisor G with supp(G) ∩ supp(D) = ∅ and deg(G) = 2g + t. This is possible by the Weak Approximation Theorem (see e.g. [27] ). Alternatively, in case |P q (F)| > n + 1, select a place Q ∈ P q (F) \ {P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P n } and define G = (2g + t) · Q. In any case, it holds that dim Fq (L(G)) = g +t+1. Next, define C as the evaluation code C(D; G). Arbitrarily choose i ∈ {0, 1, . . . n}, A ⊂ {0, 1, . . . n} \ {i} with |A| = t.
Hence, there exists f ∈ L(G) such that f (P i ) = 1 and f (P j ) = 0 for all j ∈ A. In particular, for C as well as for C it holds that the i-th coordinate is not always zero.
. From deg(2G) = 4g + 2t and 4g < n − 3t, it follows that d min ( C) ≥ n + 1 − deg(2G) = n + 1 − (4g + 2t) > t + 1. In particular, it follows that u i ∈ C. We conclude that C ∈ C † (F q ) and I(C) = I(C), and using Theorem 1, that
The claim about t-strong multiplicativity of Σ(C) follows from Theorem 2.
It follows from this theorem that τ (q) > 0 if A(q) > 4, where A(q) is Ihara's constant (see Section 2) . Recall that the Drinfeld-Vladuts bounds states that A(q) ≤ √ q − 1. For our purposes, however, we need a lower bound. Ihara [18] has shown that if q is a square, then A(q) ≥ √ q − 1, so that the Drinfeld-Vladuts bound is sharp. Later, Garcia and Stichtenoth [15] showed this result by more explicit methods (see also [1] for recent results over cubic fields).
Theorem 4 (Ihara [18] , Garcia and Stichtenoth [15] ) Let F q be a finite field and let q be a square. Then A(q) = √ q − 1. More precisely, there exists an infinite family of algebraic function fields (in one variable) {F (m) } m≥1 over F q such that for all m ≥ 1, F q is the full constant field of
Theorem 5 (Serre [25] ) There exists a positive constant c * ∈ R such that for all finite fields F q we have A(q) ≥ c * · log q.
Combining Theorems 3, 4 and 5, we can bound τ (q) away from zero if either q is a square or q is extremely large 6 . Also, we see that τ (q) tends to 1 if |F q | tends to infinity. Theorem 6 (Chen and Cramer [8] ) 6 The results in [8] only considered the case q ≥ 49 with q a square. But the combination of Theorem 3 with Theorem 5 is straightforward, so we attribute that in essence to [8] . 7 Currently, c * ≥ is the best known approximation, see [29] -τ (q) ≥ 1 − 4 √ q−1 for all finite fields F q such that q ≥ 49 and q is a square.
-lim |Fq|→∞ τ (q) = 1, where F q ranges over all finite fields.
Thus, it remains to bound τ (q) away from zero in the cases where q is small (2 ≤ q < 49) or q > 49 is not a square and q is at most moderately large. We resolve this by means of a dedicated field-descent that allows us to lower bound τ (q) as a function of τ (q m ). At its heart it uses the following notion.
Definition 11 A multiplication-friendly embedding of the extension field F q m over F q is a triple (r, σ, ψ) where r is a positive integer and where σ :
and ψ : F r q → F q m are F q -linear maps such that xy = ψ(σ(x) * σ(y)) for all x, y in F q m . The integer r is called the expansion.
Note that σ is an injective F q -linear map between F q -vectorspaces: σ(x) = σ(y) implies x = x · 1 = ψ(σ(x) * σ(1)) = ψ(σ(y) * σ(1)) = y · 1 = y. Note that this notion has been studied in the context of asymptotic arithmetic complexity (see [4] and [28] ). We can now state and prove our field-descent theorem. Elementary constructions of multiplication-friendly embeddings are given afterwards.
Theorem 7 Let t, r be integers with t, r ≥ 1. Suppose C ∈ C † (F q m ) with t(C) ≥ t and suppose there exists a multiplication-friendly embedding of F q m over F q with expansion r. Then there exists
Proof. Write n = n(C). W.l.o.g., i s = 0 (Definition 8), i.e., t(C) is attained for i = 0. In particular, 0 ∈ I( C). Let π B denote the projection π F q m ) n ), i.e., all c ∈ C with π 0 (c) ∈ F q . Note that G = ∅, G is not an F q m -linear code, but G is an F qlinear subspace of the F q m -linear code C. Let (r, σ, ψ) be a multiplication-friendly embedding of F q m over F q . Define the F q -linear map χ :
. Since 0 ∈ I( C), u 0 ∈ C ⊥ by Lemma 4, or equivalently, there is c ∈ G with π 0 (c) = 1. Since π 0 (χ(c)) = 1, u 0 ∈ (C 1 ) ⊥ , and by Lemma 4, u 
Using this, it is verified easily that u 0 ∈ C 1 would imply u 0 ∈ C, a contradiction. In conclusion, 0 ∈ I( C 1 ) and hence, I( C 1 ) = ∅. We now show t(C 1 ) ≥ t. If we call each j ∈ I * (C) a "parent" index, then, using the definition of χ, each of those F q m -parent indexes can be said to have r F q -sibling indexes. If A ⊂ I * (C 1 ) is a non-empty set, then β(A) ⊂ I * (C) denotes the set of parent indexes of these siblings. Note that |β(A)| ≤ |A|. Finally, α(A) ⊂ I * (C 1 ) denotes the set of all siblings of the elements in β(A). Note that A ⊂ α(A). Now let A ⊆ I * (C 1 ) with |A| = t. Since |β(A)| ≤ t ≤ t 0 (C), there exists c ∈ G such that π 0 (c) = 1 and π β(A) (c) = 0. Since π 0 (χ(c)) = 1, π α(A) (χ(c)) = 0, and A ⊂ α(A), it follows that t 0 (C 1 ) ≥ t.
It remains to prove that r 0 ( C 1 ) ≤ rn − t. Let A 1 ⊂ I * ( C 1 ) with |A 1 | = t be an arbitrary set. Since A 1 ⊂ α(A 1 ), it will be sufficient to show that (0, B 1 ) is a reconstruction-pair for C 1 , where
, where x 0 ∈ F q and x 1 , . . . ,
We conclude by this composition and observation above that there exists an F qlinear map ρ B1,0 such that ρ B1,0 • π B1,0 (χ(c) * χ(c )) = c 0 c 0 for all c, c ∈ G. Therefore, since all elements of C 1 are of the form i λ i · (χ(c i ) * χ(c i )) with λ i ∈ F q and c i , c i ∈ G, and since ρ B1,0 • π B1,0 is an F q -linear map, it holds that r 0 ( C 1 ) ≤ rn − t as claimed.
We now present some elementary constructions of multiplication-friendly embeddings.
Theorem 8 Let m ≥ 2 be an integer with q ≥ 2m − 2, then there exists a multiplication-friendly embedding of F q m over F q with expansion 2m − 1.
with degree at most m − 1. There is an isomorphism of F q -vector spaces φ :
. Now take 2m − 2 distinct elements in F q , β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β 2m−2 , and define the map ξ :
For all x, y ∈ F q m , we then have that σ(x) = (f (β 1 ), . . . , f (β 2m−2 ), µ(f )) and σ(y) = (g(β 1 ), . . . , g(β 2m−2 ), µ(g)) where f (X),g(X) ∈ F q [X] are the unique polynomials of degree at most m − 1 with f (α) = x, g(α) = y. We have σ(x) * σ(y) = (f g(β 1 ), . . . , f g(β 2m−2 ), µ(f g)).
Since f (X) · g(X) ∈ F q [X] is of degree at most 2m − 2, evaluations in 2m − 2 points of F q determine it up to to multiplicative factor (from F q ). This factor is clearly uniquely determined when, in addition, µ(f g) is taken into account. It follows that xy = f g(α) is determined uniquely by σ(x) * σ(y), i.e. there exists a function ψ such that xy = ψ(σ(x) * σ(y)) for all x, y ∈ F q m . It is not difficult to see that ψ is F q -linear.
A construction without any constraint on q and m is presented next. The expansion in this case is quadratic in the degree of the extension. However, for quadratic extensions it is exactly the same as above.
Theorem 9 There exists a multiplication-friendly embedding of F q m over F q with expansion i . Given two elements x, y ∈ F q m , the coordinates of σ(x) * σ(y) precisely exhaust all possible expressions x i y i , as well as all possible expressions x i y i + x j y j + x i y j + x j y i for i = j. Hence, for each pair of indexes (i, j) with i = j, there exists an F q -linear map φ i,j such that φ i,j (σ(x) * σ(y)) = x i y j + x j y i . Since xy = 2m−2
k=0 ( i+j=k,i<j x i y j + x j y i )α k , it follows that there exists an F q -linear map ψ such that xy = ψ(σ(x) * σ(y)).
Corollary 3 Let F q be a finite field. There exists a multiplication-friendly embedding of F q 2 over F q with expansion equal to 3. Moreover, there exists a multiplication-friendly embedding of F 64 over F 4 with expansion equal to 5.
Proof. In the case of quadratic extensions, both multiplication-friendly embeddings give the result. For the second case, we apply Theorem 8.
We are now ready to bound τ (q) away from zero for all finite fields F q .
Definition 12
We define ν(q) as follows: ν(2) = 1/35 ≈ 2.86%; ν(3) = 1/18 ≈ 5.56%; ν(4) = 3/35 ≈ 8.57%; ν(5) = 5/54 ≈ 9.26%; for q square, q ≥ 49, ν(q) = 1 − . We note that it is possible to further improve these lower bounds especially for small values of q using more advanced techniques from algebraic geometry, as we show in upcoming work [5] .
Consequences for LSSS with Strong Multiplication
We now state the consequences for LSSS with strong multiplication explicitly.
n·H(S0) . F = {Σ n } n∈N is a family of secret sharing schemes if N ⊂ N is an infinite set and for all n ∈ N , Σ n is a secret sharing scheme with |P(Σ n )| = n. The (average) information rate λ(F) of the family F is the function λ F : N −→ R ≥0 with n → λ(Σ n ). Definition 14 F = {Σ n } n∈N is a family of ideal LSSS (over F q ) with strong multiplication if the following properties hold. F is a family of secret sharing schemes such that for all n ∈ N , Σ n = (F q , n, e (n) , v
n ) is an LSSS. Moreover, for each n ∈ N , Σ n is "ideal", i.e., dim V (n) i = 1 for i = 1, . . . n,. Finally, for all n ∈ N , Σ n has t n -strong multiplication, where t n is the maximum integer with that property. The corruption tolerance t F of F is defined as the function t F : N → R ≥0 with n → 3tn n−1 . Such a family is asymptotically good if lim sup n∈N t F (n) > 0, and asymptotically bad otherwise.
Combining Theorem 10 with Theorem 2, there are the following consequences for strongly multiplicative LSSS.
Theorem 11 Let F q be an arbitrary finite field. There exists an asymptotically good family F = {Σ n } n∈N of ideal LSSS over F q with strong multiplication such that lim n→∞ t F (n) = ν(q).
Note that over F 2 , for example, t is at least a 1/105-fraction of n, i.e. 0.95% of the players. Also note that by making q large enough, ν(q) gets arbitrarily close to 1 and, hence, t gets arbitrarily close to 1 3 n.
Asymptotically Bad Yet Elementary Schemes
We have shown that a combination of strong methods from algebraic geometry with a dedicated field-descent method leads to asymptotically good schemes over any finite field. We now show an elementary construction that also works over any finite field F q . However, it is asymptotically bad. Yet it gives t-strong multiplication for t = Ω(n/((log log n) log n)). A combination of results from [7] with replication gives an elementary family with t = Ω( √ n), which is much worse. Our construction here consists of applying a combination of Theorems 7 and 9 to Shamir's LSSS over a tower of extension fields of the base field (r m − 2) , i.e. Σ(C m ) is a Shamir's LSSS over F rm with r m − 1 players and t-strong multiplication. Now apply the construction in Theorem 7 to the codes C m , using the multiplication-friendly embedding from Theorem 8, and we descend from LSSS over F rm to LSSS over F q m . Using Theorem 9, we descent again from LSSS over F q m to LSSS over F q . Note that the final number of players is now (r m − 1)(2 q m /2 − 1)
Theorem 12 Let F q be an arbitrary finite field. The above (elementary) construction yields a family F = {Σ n } n∈N of ideal LSSS over F q with t(n)-strong multiplication, where t(n) = Ω(n/((log log n) log n).
. The code C m constructed as above gives an LSSS Σ nm for n m players and t nm -strong multiplication for t nm = 1 3 (r m − 2) . On the other hand, it is easy to see that m = O(log log n m ) and m · q m = O(log n m ). The desired result follows.
So far we have presented asymptotic lower bounds on optimal corruption tolerance. We now turn to (non-asymptotic) upper bounds on corruption tolerance of a code. Using arguments given in [8] , it follows easily that τ (C) < 1 for all C ∈ C † (F q ) with (C) large enough as a function of q (note that τ (C) = 1 is achievable if n ≤ q). In Theorem 15 below we improve this bound. The improvement is based on a combination of Theorem 2 with Theorem 13, a more general result for LSSS we prove below. Namely, we lower bound the information rate as a function of the threshold gap. Here, the threshold-gap of an SSS is defined as the difference between its reconstruction-and privacy-thresholds. A further implication is that in all interesting cases, the threshold gap necessarily grows at least as Ω(log n), where n is the number of players, in any family of LSSS over F q with positive information rate. Let Σ = (F q , n, e, v 0 , V 1 , . . . , V n ) be an LSSS over F q .
This generalizes a result from [11] where a lower bound in the dimension of any threshold LSSS over F 2 is proven. In our result, the threshold gap can be greater than 1 (and q is arbitrary). The proof of Theorem 13 will rely in part on Theorem 14 and Corollary 4 below. 8 The log-sum inequality asserts that for non-negative real numbers a1, . . . , ar and b1, . . . , br r i=1 ai log q (
Note that if A, B ∈ G, then A ∪ B ∈ Γ (Σ). If t(Σ) ≥ 1, there exists a greedy partition by induction. Moreover, the size m of a greedy partition can be bounded in terms of r(Σ), since any set in the partition has at most r(Σ) − 1 elements.
Corollary 4 Suppose t(Σ) ≥ 1 and let G be a greedy partition of P(Σ). Then dim Σ ≥ |G| · log q |G|. In particular, dim Σ ≥ n r(Σ)−1 · log q ( n r(Σ)−1 ).
Proof (of Theorem 13). We use a dualization technique from [11] . Set r = r(Σ), t = t(Σ) and g = g(Σ). Note that if Σ * is an LSSS over F q whose access structure is the dual of Σ's, then g(Σ * ) = g(Σ). Sort the players 1, . . . , n so that d i ≤ d j if i ≤ j. Let Σ 1 be the LSSS restricted to the first r + 1 players (this is possible since r < n). Clearly t(Σ 1 ) ≥ t(Σ) and r(Σ 1 ) ≤ r(Σ), so g(Σ 1 ) ≤ g(Σ). There exists an LSSS Σ * 1 over F q and defined over the first r + 1 players such that dim Σ 1 = dim Σ * 1 and Γ (Σ * 1 ) is the dual access structure to Γ (Σ 1 ) (see the remark in Section 2. ). Because of the sorting of the players,
). Finally, let Σ * now be an LSSS over F q such that dim Σ = dim Σ * and Γ (Σ * ) is the dual access structure to Γ (Σ) (note that t(Σ * ) ≥ 1 since r < n and r(Σ * ) < n since t ≥ 1). Applying the bound we have just derived, we get dim Σ * ≥ n g(Σ * ) · log q (
). But g(Σ * ) =ḡ and r(Σ * ) = n − t, so dim Σ = dim Σ * ≥ n g · log q ( n−t+1 g
). It is easy to see then that dim Σ ≥ n g log q ( n+ḡ+2 2ḡ ).
Corollary 5 Let F = {Σ n } n∈N be a family of LSSS over F q . If the growth rate of the threshold gap is smaller than logarithmic in the number of players, i.e., lim sup n∈Nḡ (Σn) log q n = 0, then the information rate satisfies lim sup n∈N λ F (n) = 0.
Theorem 15 Let C ∈ C † (F q ). We have t(C) ≤ 1 3 · (n(C) − 1 2 · log q (n(C) + 2)) and therefore τ (C) ≤ 1 − log q (n(C)+2)−2 2n(C)−2
Proof. Assume wlog that t(C) is attained for i = 0 (i.e., i s = 0, see Definition 8) and write t = t(C). Then t 0 (C) ≥ t and r 0 (C) ≤ n(C) − 2t, by Theorem 2. Now setḡ =ḡ(Σ(C)) and n = n(C). So, on the one hand, t(C) ≤ 1 3 (n −ḡ). On the other hand, Σ(C) is an "ideal" LSSS. Theorem 13 then implies n ≥ n g log q ( n+ḡ+2 2ḡ ). Thus,ḡ ≥ log q ( n+2 2ḡ ) ≥ log q (n + 2) − log q (2ḡ). Then g+log q (2ḡ) ≥ log q (n+2), and sinceḡ ≥ log q (2ḡ) for anyḡ ≥ 1,ḡ ≥ 1 2 log q (n+2). Combining these facts, the result follows.
Note that this non-asymptotic upper bound on corruption tolerance does not imply τ (q) < 1.
First, our main Theorem 10 implies that the asymptotic optimal corruption tolerance τ (q) satisfies τ (q) > 0 for all finite fields F q . The proof of that theorem makes crucial use of strong results from algebraic geometry (namely, good towers of algebraic function fields). Is that essential? Though it is not unlikely that "strong algebraic geometry" is inherent to strong lower bounds on τ (q), is there perhaps a more elementary proof just that τ (q) > 0? Second, it seems likely that the bound from Theorem 15 can be sharpened considerably. Third, it is interesting to improve our lower bounds for τ (q). We have already noted that in forthcoming work we do so for small values of q, using more advanced methods from algebraic geometry.
